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Does von Neumann Entropy Correspond to
Thermodynamic Entropy?
Abstract
Conventional wisdom holds that the von Neumann entropy corresponds to
thermodynamic entropy, but Hemmo and Shenker (2006) have recently argued
against this view by attacking von Neumann’s (1955) argument. I argue that
Hemmo and Shenker’s arguments fail due to several misunderstandings: about
statistical-mechanical and thermodynamic domains of applicability, about the
nature of mixed states, and about the role of approximations in physics. As a
result, their arguments fail in all cases: in the single-particle case, the finite
particles case, and the infinite particles case.
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1 Introduction
According to conventional wisdom in physics, von Neumann entropy corresponds to
phenomenological thermodynamic entropy. The origin of this claim is von Neumann’s
(1955) argument that his proposed entropy corresponds to the thermodynamic entropy,
which appears to be the only explicit argument for the equivalence of the two entropies.
However, Hemmo and Shenker (H&S) (2006) – and earlier, Shenker (1999) – have
argued that this correspondence fails, contrary to von Neumann. If so, this leaves
conventional wisdom without explicit justification.
Correspondence can be understood, at the very least, as a numerical consistency
check: in this context, this means that the von Neumann entropy has to be included in
calculating thermodynamic entropy to ensure consistent accounting in contexts where
both thermodynamic and von Neumann entropy are physically relevant. Successful
correspondence provides strong evidence of equivalence. While it does not guarantee
equivalence, it seems to be at least a necessary condition for equivalence. If
thermodynamic entropy and von Neumann entropy correspond, then we have reason to
think that von Neumann entropy is rightfully thermodynamic in nature, since proper
accounting of thermodynamic entropy would demand von Neumann entropy. By
contrast, a failure of correspondence seems to entail that the von Neumann entropy is
not thermodynamical in nature, since it is irrelevant to thermodynamic calculations in
contexts where both entropies are physically significant (e.g. when a system has both
quantum degrees of freedom and is sufficiently large to warrant thermodynamical
considerations).
Although Henderson (2003), in my view, has successfully criticized Shenker’s earlier
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argument, little has been done in the philosophical literature to evaluate H&S’s more
recent arguments.1 This lacuna is striking because, as I mentioned, von Neumann’s
argument appears to be the only explicit argument for correspondence for the two
entropies.
My goal in this paper is to fill this lacuna by providing a novel set of criticisms to
H&S. Here’s the plan: I introduce key terms (§2) and then present von Neumann’s
thought-experiment which aims to establish the correspondence between thermodynamic
entropy and von Neumann entropy; along the way, a novel counterpart to the usual
argument for correspondence is discussed (§3). I then present and criticize H&S’s
arguments for the single-particle case in the context of thermodynamics (§4.1) and in the
context of statistical mechanics (§4.2), the N-particles case (§4.3), and the
infinite-particles case (§4.4). I conclude that their argument fails in all cases – in turn,
we have good reasons to reject their claim that the von Neumann entropy fails to
correspond to thermodynamic entropy, and hence the claim that von Neumann entropy
is not thermodynamic in nature.
1It is only slightly better in the physics literature: Deville and Deville (2013) appears to
be the only paper to critique H&S. On the philosophical side, one (very recent) exception
is Prunkl (ms), though she restricts discussion to the single-particle case and appears to
conflate information entropy with thermodynamic entropy. See §4.1/§4.2 for why this is
not obviously right.
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2 Key Terms
Let me first define the notions of thermodynamic entropy and von Neumann entropy.
Following H&S, I define the change in thermodynamic entropy STD between two
thermodynamic states in an isothermal quasi-static process,2 as:
∆STD =
1
T
∫
P dV (1)
We will restrict our discussion to ideal gases in equilibrium (i.e. systems where pressure
P , volume V , and temperature T remain constant).
Next, the von Neumann entropy SVN, for any pure or mixed quantum system, is
defined as:
SVN = −kTr(ρ log ρ) (2)
where k is the Boltzmann constant and Tr(.) is the trace function. Generally, the
density matrix ρ is such that:
ρ =
i∑
n=1
pi |ψi〉 〈ψi| (3)
where ψ1, ψ2, ... ψn correspond to the number of pure states in a statistical mixture
represented by ρ, with p1, p2, ... pn being their associated classical probabilities (which
must sum to unity). In the case where there is only one pure state possible for a system
(e.g. when we are absolutely certain about its quantum state), then n = 1, with
2There is no change in temperature in an isothermal quasi-static process, which is why
T is taken to be constant. As a matter of historical note, von Neumann uses an isothermal
set-up in his argument, with a box containing a quantum ideal gas coupled to a (much
larger) heat sink ensuring constant temperature over time (von Neumann 1955, 361/371).
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probability 1, so the appropriate density matrix is ρ = |ψ〉 〈ψ|. For such a system in a
pure state (i.e. represented by a single state vector in Hilbert space), SVN = 0. For
mixed states (i.e. states which cannot be represented by a single state vector in Hilbert
space, hence mixture of pure states or a mixed state), Tr(ρ log ρ) < 1 and SVN > 0 in
general. A mixed state is often said to represent our ignorance about a system – this will
suffice as a first approximation (more on how to interpret this ignorance in §4.2).
Prima facie, SVN and STD appear to share nothing in common, apart from the word
‘entropy’. However, von Neumann claims that there are important correlations between
the two, which suggests a correspondence between STD and SVN.
3 Von Neumann’s Thought-Experiment
For the sake of parity, I adopt H&S’s presentation of von Neumann’s
thought-experiment,3 which aims to show that changes in thermodynamic entropy can
only be made consistent with the laws of thermodynamics if we considered the von
Neumann entropy as contributing to the calculation of the thermodynamic entropy. Fig.
1. depicts the stages of the thought-experiment.
We begin, in stage one, with a box with a partition in the middle. On one side of the
partition there is a gas at volume V , constant temperature T , and constant pressure P .
Each gas particle starts off having the pure state spin-up along the x-direction
∣∣ψ↑x〉,
which is equivalent to a superposition of spin-up and spin-down pure states along the
3It is not clear to me that von Neumann’s original 1932/1955 argument is exactly the
same as the argument H&S reproduces. However, for the sake of argument, I will refer to
H&S’s version as von Neumann’s argument in this paper.
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z-direction, labelled
∣∣ψ↑z〉 and ∣∣ψ↓z〉 respectively. According to standard quantum
mechanics, the state of each particle is thus 1√
2
(
∣∣ψ↑z〉+ ∣∣ψ↓z〉).
In this context, particles with quantum behavior may be taken to be ideal gases, i.e.
sets of particles each of which do not interact with other particles and take up
infinitesimal space. Following von Neumann’s assumptions (von Neumann 1955, 361),4
each gas particle is understood as a quantum particle with a spin degree of freedom
contained inside a large impenetrable box, and each gas particle is put inside an even
larger container isolated from the environment (i.e. the box we began with). This
ensures that each spin degree of freedom is incapable of interacting with other particles.
These boxes’ sizes also ensure that the positions of these boxes (and hence of the
particles) can be approximately classical. Since the container is much larger than each
gas particle, this ensures that the gas particles take up negligible space relative to the
massive container. Accepting these assumptions, we may then take these quantum
particles to behave like an ideal gas.5 Following H&S, we further assume that the
position degrees of freedom of the gas particles have no interaction with the spin degrees
of freedom at this point, and “due to the large mass of the boxes, the position degrees of
freedom of the gas may be taken to be classical and represented by a quantum
mechanical mixture”. (Hemmo and Shenker 2006, 155)
Moving on, stage two involves a spin measurement along the z-axis on all the
particles in the container, with a result being an equally weighted statistical mixture of
4These assumptions are borrowed from Einstein (1914). For more, see Peres (Peres
2002, 271).
5I shall follow everyone in this debate in assuming that the above set-up is physically
possible.
6
particles with either
∣∣ψ↑z〉 or ∣∣ψ↓z〉 states. As a result, the spin state of each particle is
then represented instead by a density matrix ρspin, such that:
ρspin =
1
2
(
∣∣ψ↑z〉 〈ψ↑z ∣∣+ ∣∣ψ↓z〉 〈ψ↓z ∣∣) (4)
More precisely, there should be terms for the measurement device too, when truly
considering the entire system. ρspin describes only the subsystem (i.e. the quantum ideal
gas) sans measurement device, i.e. a state with the measurement device traced out –
this is in line with von Neumann’s focus on the entropy changes due to changes in the
subsystem (von Neumann 1955, 358–379). I follow Henderson (2003) and H&S in
talking about the system’s state as though I have already traced the measurement device
out whenever measurement is involved.
Stages three and four are where the particles are (reversibly) separated according to
their spin states by a semi-permeable wall into two sides of the box, each with volume
V .6 As a result of this separation, we in effect double the mixture’s volume. The gas
expands to fill up volume V on each side.
Stage five involves an isothermal and quasi-static compression of the mixture so that
we return to a total volume V (effectively halving the volume on each side of the box),
while pressure on both sides becomes equal. Importantly, due to this compression, STD
decreases due to the decrease in volume.
6This semi-permeable wall can be assumed to be a black box which reversibly separates
particles to different sides based on their different orthogonal/disjoint states; see (von
Neumann 1955, 367–370) for discussion. I follow everyone in the debate in accepting this
assumption.
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Stage six brings all the particles into the pure spin state
∣∣ψ↑x〉 quasi-statically and
without work done, while stage seven removes the semi-permeable wall, such that the
system returns to its original state.
Fig. 1: from top to bottom, stage one to stage seven, as described by H&S.
Now consider how SVN and STD change across the various stages. Stage seven ends
with the body of gas having the same thermodynamic state (same V , same P , and
constant T ) as stage one. Furthermore, all the thermodynamic transformations
performed were reversible, and removing the wall alone does no additional work. Thus,
the system at stage one must have the same thermodynamic entropy as stage seven, i.e.
∆STD = 0, since STD depends only on the initial and final state of the system.
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∆SVN = 0 from stage one to seven too, since the system is in the same state in both the
first and seventh stages.
Since stage six does not involve thermodynamic transformations, there is no change
in STD. Likewise, the transformation of ρspin to
∣∣ψ↑x〉 here does not change SVN as the
transformation can be performed unitarily. This is possible as a result of our separation
of the gases to different sides of the box according to their spin-eigenstates - given this,
we can perform unitary operations on each side of the box (or perform the more general
measurement procedure recommended by (von Neumann 1955, 365-367)), to transform
them into the same state as stage one. Both unitary transformations and von Neumann’s
procedure do not increase SVN, and so there is no change in SVN at stage six as a result.
There are no changes in STD or SVN in stages three and four. While there is an
increase in the gas’s volume, as noted above, from V to 2V , and hence an accompanying
increase in STD by n.R.log 2,
7 there is also a compensating change in the
thermodynamic entropy of mixing8,9 by −n.R.log 2 which exactly compensates this
7Here, n refers to the number of moles of gas in the system, and R is the gas constant.
8Henderson (2003) explains the mixing entropy, describing the mixing of different gases,
crisply: “After separation, each separated gas occupies the original volume V alone. To
return to the mixture, each gas is compressed to a volume ciV (where c is the concen-
tration of the ith gas). The compression requires work W = −n.k.T∑i ci log ci to be
invested, and the entropy of the gas is reduced by ∆S = −n.k.∑i ci log ci. An increase
in entropy of the same amount must then be associated with the mixing step of removing
the partitions. This is the ‘mixing entropy’.” (Henderson 2003, 292) Separation simply
results in a decrease in entropy of the same amount.
9Tim Maudlin raised the following objection to the applicability of the entropy of mix-
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increase in STD.
10 Since the particles are in orthogonal spin states at this stage, there
are no quantum effects (e.g. ‘collapse’ effects) from simply filtering the gases with the
semi-permeable walls, and hence SVN does not change either.
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However, importantly, there is a decrease in STD in stage five, of −n.R.log 2 due to
the isothermal compression and decrease in volume. Yet, nowhere else is there any
further change in STD. We have to account for why the overall change in STD from the
first to the seventh stages is 0.
As von Neumann argues, only one possibility remains. While STD remains constant
in stage two, notice that there was an increase in SVN, of
−N.k.− log 2 = N.R
NA
.log 2 = n.R.log 2,12 as a result of the spin measurement. This is
equivalent to the change of STD in stage five. The state of each particle changes from a
ing in this context when a version of this paper was presented at a summer school. Mixing
should have a thermodynamic effect only when differences between the gases are already
assumed to be thermodynamically relevant: for example, mixing differently colored gases
should not have a thermodynamic effect unless the difference in color is thermodynamically
relevant. It is, however, not clear whether the difference in spin is a thermodynamically
relevant one, and might amount to begging the question. This is a good point, but one
that I am setting aside for now, since everyone in the debate accepts the assumption that
separating the gases here decreases the entropy of mixing. As we shall see later, a more
fundamental issue arises with using the entropy of mixing in the ‘single particle’ case.
10see (H&S 2006, 157, fn. 4).
11This is argued for in (von Neumann 1955, 370–376).
12N is the total number of particles: since each particle is assumed to be non-interacting
and independent from others under the ideal gas assumption, their entropies are additive.
NA is Avogadro’s number.
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pure state 1√
2
(
∣∣ψ↑z〉+ ∣∣ψ↓z〉) to a mixed state represented by ρspin, and hence SVN for the
gas increases on the whole. In order to ensure that entropic changes are consistent, von
Neumann thinks that we should accept SVN’s contribution to STD in this context, where
both quantum effects and thermodynamical considerations are at play. Without
accepting SVN in our entropic accounting, we end up with a violation of thermodynamics
since we have a reversible thermodynamic cycle with non-zero change in STD, contra the
Second Law. In other words, we should accept that SVN corresponds to STD.
Furthermore, the correspondence of SVN and STD in this context can be defended
from another perspective, apart from considerations about consistency from the
thermodynamic perspective: consistent accounting from the perspective of quantum
mechanics also demands correspondence. This is simply a change in perspective with
regards to the thought-experiment, but, to my knowledge, this argument has not been
explicitly made in the literature, thus underselling the case for correspondence in von
Neumann’s thought experiment.
Instead of arguing for correspondence by considering thermodynamic consistency, i.e.
ensuring that ∆STD = 0 throughout the cycle, we can also consider consistency from the
quantum mechanical perspective. We started and ended with the same spin state, and so
it should be the case that ∆SVN = 0 throughout the cycle. Yet, there is an inconsistency:
if we only consider the increase of SVN in stage two as a result of measurement, we
should end in stage seven with an increase in SVN, not ∆SVN = 0. As described, there is
nowhere else in the thought-experiment where SVN changes. However, there is a decrease
in STD in stage five due to the thermodynamic process of isothermal compression, exactly
balancing out the increase in SVN. Hence, we can ensure consistency, i.e. that
∆SVN = 0, only by taking SVN to correspond to STD. In other words, just as the
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thermodynamic accounting of STD is consistent only if we consider SVN, the quantum
entropic accounting of SVN is also consistent only if we consider STD. Consistency from
a quantum mechanical perspective also demands correspondence between SVN and STD.
Though the debate has largely focused only on how the thought-experiment
demonstrates one direction of correspondence, of SVN to STD as a result of
thermodynamical considerations, the correspondence demonstrated by this
thought-experiment in fact goes both ways. Of course, since von Neumann was focused
on demonstrating the thermodynamic nature of SVN (specifically the irreversibility of
measurement), rather than the quantum nature of STD, it was natural that he chose to
approach it the way he did.
4 Hemmo and Shenker’s Arguments
H&S disagree with von Neumann’s argument, and criticize it by considering three cases:
the single-particle case, the finite but large N particles case, and the infinite particles
case.
4.1 Single Particle Case - Thermodynamics
H&S first consider von Neumann’s argument in the single particle case (see Fig. 2).
They claim that the argument does not go through here, since STD actually remains
constant, contrary to our thought-experiment’s description. In other words, using
thermodynamical considerations, they find that SVN should not be included in our
accounting for STD.
Here’s their argument. Consider the stages where there are entropic changes. In
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stage two when the spin measurement was performed, SVN increases as before, since it
tracks the change of the particle’s spin state from pure to mixed.
Contrariwise, STD does not change in stage five (isothermal quasi-static compression)
nor anywhere else (this will be important later). After stage two, the single particle is in
either the
∣∣ψ↑z〉 state or the ∣∣ψ↓z〉 state. After stages three and four, with the expansion
and separation via semi-permeable wall, there is a particle only in one side of the box,
and not the other. We make an STD-conserving location measurement
13 to figure out
which side of the box is empty and which side the particle is at, so as to compress the
box against the empty side. The compression is then performed as per before. However,
this compression does not decrease STD:
14 to restore the volume of the ‘gas’ to V no
work needs to be done, since we are compressing against vacuum. Since there is a change
in SVN in this cycle, but no change in STD, the apparent answer, in order to do our
entropic accounting, is to ignore, not incorporate, SVN into STD. Hence SVN does not
correspond to STD.
13Prunkl (ms) claims that the location measurement leads to a violation of the Second
Law. If true, this makes H&S’s argument even more problematic. Here, for the sake of
argument, I assume that the location measurement is unproblematic.
14As an anonymous reviewer rightfully notes, the location measurement is important for
ensuring ∆STD = 0 here. Without the location measurement, we might end up compress-
ing in the wrong direction against the side with the gas, rather than the empty vacuum
- this will have thermodynamic effects since we are doing work on the gas. However, the
H&S set-up emphasizes the location measurement, and I will play along for the sake of
argument.
13
Fig. 2: from top to bottom, stage one to stage seven for the single particle case as described by H&S.
Their analysis is problematic. Though their ultimate point in this analysis – that STD
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fails to corresponds to SVN – still holds, it does not hold in the way they claim. In fact,
the way it fails suggests to us that we should disregard the single particle case.
For the single particle case, they claim that “... [STD] is null throughout the
experiment.” (H&S 2006, 162) This then allows them to claim that thermodynamic
accounting for STD is consistent only if we did not consider SVN. This then supports
their claim that SVN does not correspond to STD since adding SVN into the
thermodynamic accounting actually renders the otherwise consistent calculations
inconsistent.
They are right to say that the stage five compression (after location measurement)
has no thermodynamic effect because we are compressing against vacuum: no work needs
to be done, and so ∆STD = 0 for stage five. However, I claim that ∆STD 6= 0 for the
single particle case overall, because ∆STD 6= 0 in stages three and four in this context.
As far as I can tell, H&S did not analyze stage three and four, i.e. the isothermal
expansion and separation, in terms of the single particle case at all. Rather, they seem
to have assumed that ∆STD = 0 in these stages as with the original case of the
macroscopic gas.15 However, this assumes that there is both a change in entropy of
n.R.log 2 due to isothermal expansion and a change in the entropy of mixing of
−n.R.log 2 due to separation, as they say so themselves for the original case: “The
increase of thermodynamic entropy due to the volume increase ∆S = 1
T
∫
P dV is
exactly compensated by the decrease of thermodynamic mixing entropy ∆S =∑
wk ln wk (where wk is the relative frequency of molecules of type k) due to the
separation.” (H&S 2006, 157, fn. 4, emphasis mine)
In the single particle case, it makes sense that isothermal expansion should still
15Prunkl (ms) appears to do the same.
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increase STD, since the single particle ‘gas’ is expanding against a piston and doing work.
However, it does not make physical sense to speak of the entropy of mixing here at all,
since there is no separation of gases in the single particle case. The entropy of mixing is
explicitly defined for systems where different gases are separated from/mixed with one
another via semi-permeable walls, but a single particle cannot be separated from/mixed
with itself. The quote above makes this conceptual point explicit: by H&S’s own lights,
the relative frequency of a single particle is simply unity (and null for particles of other
types), so the entropy of mixing is 1 ln 1 = 0. There is no thermodynamic entropy of
mixing in the single particle case.
Discounting the entropy of mixing, however, we find that ∆STD = n.R.log 2 6= 0 for
stages three and four, and hence for the entire process, contrary to H&S’s claim.
Interestingly, correspondence does fail to obtain between STD and SVN, since ∆STD+
∆SVN = 2n.R.log 2 6= 0, despite the process being reversible ex hypothesi : incorporating
SVN into thermodynamic accounting violates the Second Law.
However, on this new analysis, we gain some clarity as to why the single particle case
is problematic. While it is true that incorporating SVN into the thermodynamic
accounting violates the Second Law, STD accounting by itself also violates the Second
Law (contrary to H&S). Even without considering SVN, ∆STD 6= 0 despite the process
being reversible. Thermodynamic accounting is inconsistent here no matter what we do,
which suggests that the reversible process they described for the single particle case is
thermodynamically unsound: if so, any argument H&S make in this context may be
disregarded.
The upshot: I agree with H&S that correspondence fails for the single particle case,
but not why it fails. It is not because the process they described is already
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thermodynamically consistent without taking SVN into account. Rather, it is because
the process is already thermodynamically inconsistent anyway.
In recent work, John Norton argued that thermodynamically reversible processes for
single-particle systems are impossible in principle, which might explain why the process
described by H&S is thermodynamically unsound: it was not justified to assume the
process was reversible for a single particle system. For Norton, a reversible process is
“loosely speaking, one whose driving forces are so delicately balanced around equilibrium
that only a very slight disturbance to them can lead the process to reverse direction.
Because such processes are arbitrarily close to a perfect balance of driving forces, they
proceed arbitrarily slowly while their states remain arbitrarily close to equilibrium
states.” (Norton 2017, 135) Norton notes that these thermodynamic equilibrium states
are balanced not because there are no fluctuations, but because these fluctuations are
negligible for macroscopic systems. However, fluctuations relative to single-particle
systems are large, and generally prevent these systems from being in equilibrium states
at any point of the process, rendering reversible processes impossible in the single
particle case. (Norton 2017, 135) If reversible processes are impossible for single particle
systems in general, then it should come as no surprise that the particular single particle
reversible process used by H&S is likewise thermodynamically unsound, as my analysis
above suggests. If so, H&S’s claim that correspondence fails in this process is simply
besides the point, since this process is not thermodynamic at all.
Since any reversible process cannot be realized for single particle systems in general,
the issue seems not to be with any particular process per se, but with the single particle
case simpliciter. To my knowledge, no one prior to H&S discussed von Neumann’s
experiment in terms of a single particle; von Neumann (1955), Peres (1990, 2002),
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Shenker (1999) and Henderson (2003) all explicitly or implicitly assume a large (or
infinite) number of particles. This is for good reason. As H&S acknowledge, and as we
have seen: “The case of a single particle is known to be problematic as far as arguments
in thermodynamics are concerned”. (H&S 2006, 158) Matter in phenomenological
thermodynamics is assumed to be continuous.16 A ‘gas’ composed of one particle can be
many things, but it is surely not continuous in any commonly accepted sense. In other
words, it is just not clear whether the domain of thermodynamics should apply to the
single-particle case at all.
As Myrvold (2011) notes, Maxwell also made a similar claim with regards to
phenomenological thermodynamics in general ; it does not and should not hold in the
single particle case. On his view, the laws of phenomenological thermodynamics, notably
the Second Law, must be continually violated on small scales:
If we restrict our attention to any one molecule of the system, we shall find
its motion changing at every encounter in a most irregular manner.
If we go on to consider a finite number of molecules, even if the system to
which they belong contains an infinite number, the average properties of this
group, though subject to smaller variations than those of a single molecule,
are still every now and then deviating very considerably from the theoretical
mean of the whole system, because the molecules which form the group do
not submit their procedure as individuals to the laws which prescribe the
behaviour of the average or mean molecule.
16See Compagner (1989) for a discussion of the so-called ‘continuum limit’ as a coun-
terpart to the thermodynamic limit in phenomenological thermodynamics.
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Hence the second law of thermodynamics is continually being violated, and
that to a considerable extent, in any sufficiently small group of molecules
belonging to a real body. As the number of molecules in the group is
increased, the deviations from the mean of the whole become smaller and less
frequent [...] (Maxwell 1878, 280)
The Second Law, and hence phenomenological thermodynamics, should not be expected
to hold true universally in small scale cases, and especially not in the single-particle case.
Von Neumann and everyone else in the debate should have recognized this point. Why,
then, should it matter that the thought-experiment succeeds or fails in this case?
Phenomenological thermodynamics does not apply to single-particle cases. There is thus
no profit in trying to establish correspondence between SVN and STD in this case.
Indeed, if we took seriously Maxwell’s claim that the Second Law fails at small scales, a
failure of thermodynamic entropic accounting might even be expected ; it does not rule
out the possible thermodynamic nature of SVN even though the sum of SVN and STD
might be inconsistent with the Second Law. In short, it is not clear why the
single-particle case is relevant to the discussion at hand.
H&S’s reasoning is untenable, because they fail to respect the context of
phenomenological thermodynamics by bringing it into a context where it is not expected
to hold. Instead, it seems more appropriate that the single-particle case is precisely
beyond the purview of classical thermodynamics, requiring an analogue that only
corresponds to classical thermodynamics at the appropriate scales and limits. We may
then take SVN to be the analogue of STD in this case, only approximating STD as the
system in question approaches the context suitable for traditional thermodynamic
19
analysis. If so, we may see von Neumann as merely demonstrating that SVN corresponds,
not at all domains but in the domain where thermodynamics is taken to hold, to STD.
4.2 Single Particle Case Redux - Statistical Mechanics and
Information
Given the foregoing discussion, H&S might insist that SVN fails to correspond to STD
even when take into account a more relevant domain for single particles – statistical
mechanics.
After directly arguing that SVN does not correspond to STD (H&S 2006, 162–165),
they further argue that SVN does not correspond to information entropy (more on this
below) in the single-particle case. Prima facie, this should seem irrelevant to von
Neumann’s argument, which was to establish the correspondence of the thermodynamic
STD and quantum SVN: why should information entropy’s failure to correspond with
SVN be a worry at all?
Here’s one plausible worry, on a charitable reading. If information entropy
corresponds to STD, and H&S shows that SVN fails to correspond to information
entropy, then we might conclude, indirectly, that SVN does not correspond to STD after
all.17 This argument assumes that information entropy does correspond to STD, an
assumption H&S seem to hold as well: this is in line with the so-called ‘subjectivist’
17Caveat: I am not committed to the information entropy’s relationship to thermody-
namics. One may, like Earman and Norton (1998, 1999), be skeptical that information
entropy is related to STD at all, in which case H&S’s argument here is simply irrelevant.
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view of statistical mechanics.18 Furthermore, my above argument against the
misapplication of phenomenological thermodynamics does not seem to apply here, since
this argument is being made in the context of statistical mechanics and its particle
picture, with no commitment to phenomenological thermodynamics.
However, H&S do not do much to motivate the linkage between information entropy
and STD; indeed, in their words, “a linkage between the Shannon information and
thermodynamic entropy has not been established” (H&S 2006, 164). Without this link,
the failure of correspondence between the information entropy and SVN appears, at best,
irrelevant to the correspondence between STD and SVN. Nevertheless, I will take a
charitable view here and assume that there is a correspondence between information
entropy and STD, for the sake of assessing their argument. Here’s a plausible (if
arguable) sketch: if one were a subjectivist like Jaynes (1957), one might take the Gibbs
entropy in statistical mechanics to be a special case of the information entropy. After all,
both have the form:
−
∑
i
pi ln pi (5)
with i being the number of possible states with associated probabilities of occurring pi,
with the Gibbs entropy being multiplied by an additional Boltzmann’s constant k.19 We
know that statistical mechanics corresponds to phenomenological thermodynamics at the
thermodynamic limit so we can think of the Gibbs entropy, and hence information
entropy, as corresponding to STD. I take this to be in line with what H&S have in mind:
“to the extent that the Shannon information underwrites the thermodynamic entropy, it
18Notably, see Jaynes (1957).
19Using the so-called Planck units, where k = 1, Gibbs entropy and information entropy
are then formally equivalent.
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does so via statistical mechanics” (2006, 165). Assuming that the above picture is
plausible, a failure of correspondence between SVN and the information entropy provides
evidence against the correspondence between SVN and STD.
Their argument comes into two parts. Ignoring STD for the time being (which does
not change throughout the cycle for the single-particle case – see §4.1), they claim that
we can consider the stage five location measurement to be a decrease in information
entropy of ln 2, as a result of learning information about which one of two parts of the
box the particle is in. On first glance, this seems to resolve the arithmetic inconsistency
in entropic accounting: ln 2 is exactly the increase in SVN as a result of the spin state
changing from a pure state
∣∣ψ↑x〉 to the mixed state ρspin in stage two. In other words, for
both the information and von Neumann entropy’s accounting to be correct (i.e. net
change of zero across the cycle), we must consider SVN as corresponding to information
entropy. Now, since information entropy also corresponds, ex hypothesi, to STD, we have
an indirect argument for the correspondence of SVN to STD.
However, H&S claim that this argument fails for collapse interpretations, i.e.
interpretations of quantum mechanics on which a superposed quantum state ontologically
collapses into a pure state upon measurement (either precisely or approximately).20 They
allow that, on no-collapse interpretations, e.g. Bohmian or many-worlds interpretations,
the location measurement in stage five does not decrease SVN, since the state of the
system never changes in light of measurements, and so the above argument goes through.
Let us see what they could mean by this claim by following the state of the particle
through the cycle. At stage two, everyone agrees that the state of the system is ρspin
20On GRW-type approaches, though, collapse occurs with or without measurement, but
measurement increases the likelihood of collapse, roughly speaking.
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following the z-spin measurement; SVN increases by ln 2. At this point, the particle’s
position degrees of freedom remain independent from its spin degrees of freedom, as per
our ideal gas assumption, though we might assume the particle starts out on the left half
of the box, with the mixture of position states ρpos(L) with ‘L’ representing the left side.
(Consider Fig. 1 but with only one particle). Following the semipermeable wall’s
filtering at stages three and four, the location of the particle becomes classically
correlated with the spin. Let’s say that the semipermeable wall sends
∣∣ψ↑z〉 particles to
the left, represented by ρpos(L), and
∣∣ψ↓z〉 particles to the right, represented by ρpos(R).
As such, the (mixed) state of the particle is now:
ρparticle =
1
2
( ∣∣ψ↑z〉 〈ψ↑z ∣∣⊗ ρpos(L) + ∣∣ψ↓z〉 〈ψ↓z ∣∣⊗ ρpos(R)) (6)
For no-collapse interpretations, H&S agree that the state of the particle stays the same
as above after the location measurement in stage five. We perform the compression in
stage five and remove the partition at the end of stage six, thereby removing the classical
correlations between position and spin. No further change in either information entropy
or SVN occurs, and hence the correspondence goes through (H&S 2006, 164) - the spin
state remains mixed until unitarily transformed into a pure state and completing the
cycle.
For collapse interpretations, they claim that the location measurement decreases SVN
by ln 2, because, on collapse interpretations, the state of the particle upon the
measurement, depending on which side the particle is found, becomes:
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ρparticle =

∣∣ψ↑z〉 〈ψ↑z ∣∣⊗ ρpos(L)∣∣ψ↓z〉 〈ψ↓z ∣∣⊗ ρpos(R) (7)
The spin state of the system here effectively goes from being a mixed state to a pure
state as a result of this measurement: SVN decreases by ln 2. Summing up the entropy
changes, there was a decrease of ln 2 in information entropy, and a net change of zero for
SVN as a result of the increase in stage two and the decrease in stage five. Overall, then,
the change is not zero but −ln 2; our accounting has gone awry, and there is a failure of
correspondence between SVN and information entropy. If this is right, SVN does not
correspond to STD.
However, I think that H&S are wrong to claim that SVN decreases following the
location measurement for collapse interpretations. As Prunkl (Prunkl ms, 11–12) notes,
there is an inconsistency here. Everyone, including H&S, agrees that the spin state of
the particle is mixed – not pure – after stage two’s spin measurement, even on collapse
interpretations (H&S 2006, 160). In that case, why does the particle’s spin become pure
after the location measurement?
I think this results from a confusion over the nature of mixed states. In particular,
they seem to have adopted what Hughes (Hughes 1992, §5.4, §5.8) call the “ignorance
interpretation” of mixed states, confusing what I call classical and quantum ignorance.
They seem to be assuming that mixed states simply represents classical ignorance, i.e.
the lack of knowledge about a particular system: a system represented by a mixed state
really is in a pure state, but we know not which. This is why the location measurement
is supposed to reveal to us the pure state of this system (by revealing which side it is on
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and hence the correlated spin state) and hence ‘wash away’ our classical ignorance of the
real state of the system - post-measurement, we know exactly which pure state this
system is in, unlike pre-measurement; hence SVN decreases.
However, as Hughes (Hughes 1992, 144/150) argues, this interpretation of mixed
states – as representing classical ignorance about which pure state a particular system is
in – cannot be the right interpretation of all mixed states. To begin, a mixed state can
be decomposed in non-unique ways in general. Here’s a simple example: a mixed state
representing a mixture of
∣∣ψ↑z〉 and ∣∣ψ↓z〉 can also represent a mixture of ∣∣ψ↑x〉 and ∣∣ψ↓x〉
and so on. If we insist that a mixed state represent our classical ignorance about the real
state of a particular system, then we end up having to say that a system’s state is really
both either
∣∣ψ↑z〉 or ∣∣ψ↓z〉, and either ∣∣ψ↑x〉 or ∣∣ψ↓x〉. Of course, this is impossible given
quantum mechanics. The defender of the classical ignorance interpretation might insist
that we simply pick one pair of possible pure states but not both at once. In general,
however, there’s no way to do that non-arbitrarily given some density matrix.
Furthermore, this problem only worsens when we consider that there are usually more
than just two ways to decompose a density matrix - a principled choice based on the
mixed state alone is not feasible. The mixed state cannot be a representation of classical
ignorance.
Instead, to paraphrase Hughes (Hughes 1992, 144–145), mixed states should be
(minimally) interpreted as such: if we prepared in the same way an ensemble of systems,
each described with the same mixed state, i.e. a mixture of pure states with certain
weights, then the relative frequency of any given measurement outcome from the
ensemble is exactly what we would get if the ensemble comprised of various
‘sub-ensembles’ each in one of the pure states in the mixture, with the relative frequency
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of each sub-ensemble in the ensemble given by the corresponding weights.
In other words, the sort of quantum ignorance relevant in the right interpretation of
mixed states is not whether we are ignorant about the real state of this particular
system, but whether we are ignorant about the measured states of an ensemble of
identically prepared systems like this one. If this is right, quantum ignorance cannot be
‘washed away’ upon measurement of a single system unlike the sort of ignorance H&S
were implicitly assuming, and it seems like this quantum ignorance is precisely what
remains after the location measurement.
This was roughly Henderson’s (2003) criticism against Shenker (1999), which is why
it is puzzling that H&S (2006) commit the same mistake:
This preparation produces the pure states [
∣∣ψ↓z〉] and [∣∣ψ↑z〉] with equal
probabilities. In a particular trial, the observer may take note of the
measurement result, and he therefore discovers that he has say a [
∣∣ψ↑z〉]. If he
applies a projective measurement in the [{∣∣ψ↑z〉 , ∣∣ψ↓z〉}] basis, he could predict
that he will measure [
∣∣ψ↑z〉]. However, this does not mean that, if someone
handed him another state prepared in the same way, he could again predict
that the outcome of his measurement would be [
∣∣ψ↑z〉]. In this sense the
observer does not know the state of the system which is being prepared, and
it is because of this ignorance that the state is mixed. Looking at the
measurement result does not remove the fact that there is a probability
distribution over the possible outcomes. (Henderson 2003, 294)
This applies to the location measurement in stage five too: measuring the location of the
particle in this case does not change the state of the particle from a mixed one to a pure
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one even on collapse interpretations. Firstly, it seems quite irrelevant whether we adopt
a collapse or no-collapse interpretation, because the collapse mechanism applies to
superposed pure states, not statistical mixtures. If anything, collapse had already
happened in the stage two measurement procedure, yet everyone including H&S (H&S
2006, 160) accepts that the system is in a mixed state after stage two even for collapse
interpretations. More importantly, there remains a probability distribution over the
states of the particle as a result of stage two’s spin measurement, even after the location
measurement. Given an ensemble of particles prepared from stages one to five in the
same way, we are still not be able to predict with certainty whether an ensemble of
particles would all be measured on the left or right sides of the box (and hence all
spin-up or spin-down) as a result of the mixed state resulting from stage two, only that
half of the ensembles will be on the left and the other half will be on the right. Quantum
ignorance remains – the system remains in a mixed state even after the location
measurement, as:
ρparticle =
1
2
( ∣∣ψ↑z〉 〈ψ↑z ∣∣⊗ ρpos(L) + ∣∣ψ↓z〉 〈ψ↓z ∣∣⊗ ρpos(R)) (8)
This is exactly the state of the system in no-collapse interpretations, i.e. quantum
ignorance does not discern between collapse and no-collapse interpretations. What has
gone away is the classical ignorance that H&S (mistakenly) assumed was relevant for
mixed states, ignorance about this particular system’s state. By measuring the system’s
location, we come to learn of the correlations between location measurement and the
particle’s spin. This ignorance does not change the mixed state to a pure state: instead,
this loss of classical ignorance – gain in information – is represented as a decrease in
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information entropy just as before, and this information is what we use to perform the
compression in stage five.
As a result, there is no additional decrease in SVN in stage five for collapse
interpretations; the entropy accounting lines up after all, as with no-collapse
interpretations: the decrease in information entropy does correspond to the increase in
SVN, and so information entropy does correspond to SVN after all. H&S’s argument
does not establish the failure of correspondence between SVN and STD via the failure of
SVN and information entropy to correspond.
To sum up, their arguments in the single-particle case are either ill-motivated and
irrelevant to von Neumann and our discussion of correspondence when considered in
terms of phenomenological thermodynamics, or outright fails when considered in the
more relevant domain of (informational approaches to) statistical mechanics. Either way,
their argument does not support the failure of correspondence between SVN and STD.
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21Let me briefly note that their argument in the two particles case fails for similar
reasons. On the one hand, from the perspective of phenomenological thermodynamics,
their argument is irrelevant: following Maxwell and others, two particles do not a ther-
modynamic system make. On the other hand, in the domain of statistical mechanics,
the analysis in terms of information entropy is irrelevant from non-informational views of
statistical mechanics. From an informational perspective, however, their argument rests
again on the supposed difference between collapse and no-collapse interpretations of mixed
states. Since this difference is non-existent, their argument likewise fails apart in that case.
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4.3 Finitely Many Particles
H&S’s argument in the case of finitely many particles rests on the assumption of
equidistribution, i.e. that the particles will be equally distributed across the left and
right sides of the box after separation by the semi-permeable wall.
Assuming equidistribution, the increase in SVN given the spin measurement in stage
two is Nln2 (H&S 2006, 169). Furthermore, the decrease in thermodynamic entropy in
the fourth stage is Nln2 as well. The entropic accounting therefore seems to work out.
However, H&S press further on the ‘rough’ nature of equidistribution when N is
large but finite: they claim that the change in SVN will only only be Nln2 when N is
infinite, since equidistribution only truly holds when N →∞. In other cases, SVN will
strictly only approximate STD, and hence SVN and STD combined will never be exactly
zero; hence, “Von Neumann’s argument goes through as an approximation” (H&S 2006,
169). However, they claim that this state of affairs suggest, instead, that von Neumann’s
argument strictly fails : “[...] since Von Neumann’s argument is meant to establish a
conceptual identity between the quantum mechanical entropy and thermodynamic
entropy, we think that such an implication is mistaken [...] no matter how large N may
be, as long as it is finite, the net change of entropy throughout the experiment will not
be exactly zero.” (H&S 2006, 169)
As I have already discussed in §4.1, it is not clear to me that von Neumann’s goal really
was to establish strict identity (what they call “conceptual identity”), i.e.
correspondence between SVN and STD in all domains. Rather, it seems to be the
establishing of correspondence only in domains where STD is taken to hold. If so, their
argument here simply misses the point.
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Furthermore, as is well-known, the particle analogue of thermodynamics, statistical
mechanics, become equivalent to phenomenological thermodynamics only when N =∞,
viz. when N arrives at the thermodynamic limit. As such, to complain that SVN does
not match up to STD outside of this domain is to demand the unreasonable, since it is
not clear that even statistical mechanics, the bona fide particle analogue of
thermodynamics, can satisfy this demand. Since SVN approximates STD the same way
statistical mechanical entropies approximate STD (and becomes equivalent at N =∞),
and physicists generally accept that statistical mechanics corresponds to
thermodynamics nevertheless, why should this problem of approximation be particularly
problematic for SVN? I think H&S take too seriously the notion of conceptual identity
involved in von Neumann’s thought-experiment to be strict equality, though I suspect a
better way to understand von Neumann’s strategy is to understand SVN as an
approximation to STD that is more fundamental than STD in small N cases, but
becomes part of the STD calculus in domains where STD applies.
To have a case against SVN as a quantum analogue of STD in the case of finitely
many particles, H&S must explain what exactly the problem is with approximations in
this case, if it has worked out so well for the case of statistical mechanics and
thermodynamics. If not, they might just be “taking thermodynamics too seriously’.22
One might say something stronger: unless they can justify why we cannot use
approximations at all in science, they do not have a case at all. As they note themselves,
STD is itself only on average approximately −Nln2 (H&S 2006, 169), only being equal
to −Nln2 when N =∞. So, in fact, the approximate quantity of SVN, ∼ Nln2, exactly
matches the approximate quantity of STD, ∼ −Nln2, in the case of finitely many
22See Callender (2001).
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particles. Unless there is something wrong with approximations in physics in general,
this, then, is in fact a case of SVN corresponding to STD, contrary to their argument.
4.4 Infinitely Many Particles
H&S consider von Neumann’s argument in the infinite particles case in two different
ways: one as N →∞ and one as N =∞. As they rightly point out, the two cases are
very different for calculations of physical quantities.
Consider stage two and stage five in this context. H&S emphasize that a spin
measurement is “a physical operation which takes place in time” (H&S 2006, 170),
which constrains what is physically possible.
For the case where N →∞, stage two is to be understood as a succession of physical
measurements where “we measure individual quantities of each of the particles
separately and only then count the relative frequencies” (H&S 2006, 170), before coming
up with a density matrix describing this state. In this case, as with the case described in
§4.3, SVN approaches Nln2 as N →∞. Their complaint here consist of two premises:
one, that, as with §4.3, SVN never reaches Nln2 unless N =∞. Two, that since
measurements are physical measurements, we can never perform an infinite series of
these measurements, and so we can never measure infinite particles. A fortiori the
measurable SVN can never arrive at Nln2, and so the entropic accounting is again
supposed to be inconsistent if we consider both SVN and STD.
However, it is clear that their argument is moot given a clear understanding of the
sort of thermodynamics we are interested in (see §4.3). While it is true that SVN will
never reach Nln2, recall that STD (or, more likely, one of its statistical mechanical
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analogues, given the domain of finitely many particles merely approaching ∞ rather than
N =∞) will likewise never reach Nln2. In other words, it does not matter that we can
never perform an infinite series of these measurements, and hence never come to know of
SVN at the thermodynamic limit, since we can likewise never have a thermodynamic
entropy equivalent to Nln2 unless we are at the thermodynamic limit. The two
entropies, then, in fact correspond in this case.
What of the second case? Here, H&S concede that “arithmetically Von Neumann’s
argument goes through at the infinite limit” (H&S 2006, 172), which makes sense
because, as I have insisted so far, von Neumann’s strategy was never to demonstrate the
strict identity of SVN and STD, i.e. the correspondence of SVN and STD in all domains.
Instead, it was to show that SVN corresponds to STD only in the domain where
phenomenological thermodynamics hold, in all other cases merely approximating STD in
large N cases or replacing it altogether (in e.g. single-particle cases). I maintain that
H&S’s main mistake was to confuse the domain where phenomenological
thermodynamics hold, with domains where they do not hold.
H&S complain that “[...] real physical systems are finite. This means that Von
Neumann’s argument does not establish a conceptual identity between the Von Neumann
entropy and thermodynamic entropy of physical systems. Identities of physical properties
mean that the two quantities refer to the same magnitude in the world.” (H&S 2006,
172) In line with what I have said in §4.1, it seems that there was no physically
meaningful theoretical term in phenomenological thermodynamics that could refer to
some quantity in the single-particle case, which was why von Neumann needed to come
up with a new measure of entropy to begin with. Furthermore, extending a concept to a
new domain does not require strict identity, as we have seen and understood for a long
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time in the case of statistical mechanics and phenomenological thermodynamics.
As Peres (2002) summarizes: “There should be no doubt that von Neumann’s
entropy. . . is equivalent to the entropy of classical thermodynamics. (This statement
must be understood with the same vague meaning as when we say that the quantum
notions of energy, momentum, angular momentum, etc., are equivalent to the classical
notions bearing the same names).” (Peres 2002, 174) ‘Equivalence’ here should not be
understood in terms of strict (or conceptual) identity i.e. correspondence at all domains.
Rather, we should understand equivalence loosely as correspondence in the suitable
domains of application, and successful extension of old concepts in these domains to new
domains. As Peres noted above, ‘equivalence’ should be understood in the context of
discovery, where one is trying to develop new concepts which are analogous to old ones
in different domains. For von Neumann, we have a theory (phenomenological
thermodynamics) that is well-understood, but also another theory (quantum mechanics)
that we want to understand in light of the former theory. Finding correspondence
provides us with ways to extend concepts from the original theory to the new theory: for
example, with SVN we may now define ‘something like’ STD whereas before there was no
way to talk about these cases. The same goes for statistical mechanics: by finding a
correspondence between e.g. temperature to mean kinetic energy in the thermodynamic
limit, we can extend the notion of ‘something like’ temperature beyond its original
domain into systems with small numbers of particles, whereas before there was, again, no
way to talk about these cases.
I see nothing wrong in these cases in the context of discovery. We should give up a
strong and untenable notion of conceptual identity in this context. If so, H&S’s
objection loses much bite.
33
They further claim that “the fact that the behavior of the two quantities coincides
approximately for a very large number of particles is not enough, because in any
ensemble of finite gases there are systems in which the identity will not be true. This
means that in a real experiment the Von Neumann entropy is not identical with the
thermodynamic entropy.” (H&S 2006, 172) This again reveals a confusion between
phenomenological and statistical thermodynamics. If they want to talk about particles
at all, it seems they must adopt some form of statistical mechanical picture with
microscopic variables, given phenomenological thermodynamics’ emphasis on purely
macroscopic variables like volume or temperature. Yet, if so, they must recognize that
thermodynamic entropy STD is in general not strictly identical to statistical mechanical
entropy, e.g. the Gibbs entropy or information entropy (briefly discussed in §4.2) either.
Their complaint about approximate coincidences not being enough for (the relevant sort
of) equivalence thus weakens significantly, especially since they must assume some such
equivalence (which cannot be strict identity) to even talk about particles within the
context of phenomenological thermodynamics to begin with. Furthermore, statistical
mechanics is evidently empirically successful in explaining and predicting traditionally
thermodynamic phenomena despite this ‘non-equivalence’ – it is not clear why this
‘non-equivalence’ should matter if, for all practical purposes, statistical mechanics is the
conceptual successor of thermodynamics. Of course, if they could come up with a
principled reason why approximations should not be allowed period, while accounting for
statistical mechanics’ empirical success in accounting for thermodynamic behavior, then
this could change. As of now, I see no such argument forthcoming.
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5 Conclusion, and Some Open Questions
Given the above, I hope to have shown that H&S’s argument against the correspondence
of SVN and STD – to my knowledge the only one in the philosophical literature – fails to
hold in all three cases considered (§4.1 – §4.4), as a result of their misunderstanding
about domains where phenomenological thermodynamics should hold and domains
where it should not. This is compounded with misunderstandings about the role of
approximations and the relevant interpretation of density matrices and ignorance in
quantum mechanics. I conclude that their argument fails on the whole; the
correspondence holds for now.
Of course, even if H&S’s claims were debunked, this does not yet amount to a
positive argument for the equivalence between von Neumann entropy and
thermodynamic entropy. Even assuming correspondence, correspondence does not entail
equivalence. However, the former does provide good prima facie reasons to believe the
latter, especially given the novel take on correspondence I provided in the end of §3: we
can accept the correspondence based on thermodynamic considerations about the Second
Law and STD accounting, but also based on quantum mechanical considerations about
SVN accounting. The correspondence supports a ‘two-way street’ – equivalence –
between STD and SVN.
While I hope to have conclusively refuted H&S’s argument, this is but the beginning
of further inquiry into questions arising from this supposed correspondence. Amidst the
tangle of entropies, there remains much more housekeeping to be done for philosophers
of physics.
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